For decades, Germany’s federal system has been viewed internationally as a model of stability, subsidiarity, and institutional balance. But recent years have seen a more critical discourse emerge, reflecting concerns about the governance, coordination, and resilience of the ‘German model’. Why the Germans Do It Better has given way to Broken Republik.

This event explores whether German federalism still offers useful lessons for Scotland and the UK. With opening reflections from Angus Robertson MSP, Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture, and a conversation with him to follow, the discussion will consider how Germany's system of territorial governance has evolved, what challenges it now faces, and how this experience might inform ongoing debates about devolution, democracy, and reform in Scotland and the wider UK.

Speaker: Angus Robertson MSP, Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, External Affairs and Culture

Panel Chair: Dr Davide Vampa, Co-Director of the Centre on Constitutional Change 

Discussants: Dr Elke Heins and Dr Benjamin Martill (Centre on Constitutional Change and Europa Institute)

Jointly organised by the British-German Association and the Centre on Constitutional Change.

Registration:

By David Melding and Glyndwr Cennydd Jones

June 2025 saw release ofThe Federal-Confederal Letters by David Melding and Glyndwr Cennydd Jones. This booklet includes their correspondence spanning October 2023 to March 2025, a period encompassing the UK General Election of July 2024 and the beginnings of the second US Trump presidency.

As the authors jointly explain:

‘When we embarked on this correspondence roughly two years ago, in the context of a different government, nations gradually emerging from beneath the carapace of Covid, and the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of its neighbouring democracy, Ukraine, we neither of us knew quite what to expect.’ 

‘We first met in person as panellists at a joint conference arranged by the Federal and James Madison Trusts in Westminster London during October 2022, going on to appear in two episodes of a podcast for the Institute of Welsh Affairs in June 2023, and it was shortly after these that we agreed to explore further. Our intention was to have an open and creative conversation, not a narrow argument, and we hope to have succeeded. To us personally it has been a rewarding dialogue from which we have learned much.’

The letters explore issues of constitutional history and development both in the UK and internationally, making the case for much needed reform of the UK’s governing framework through sharing views and experiences on models of devolution, federalism and confederalism.

David Melding writes:

‘If multi-national states are worth protecting in the interest of international comity and stability, then a high value needs to be placed on their judicious reform. Where nationalists might be criticised for the speed at which they would dissolve states, unionists are liable to equally condign judgement if they refuse necessary reforms to make multi-national states more sustainable.’

‘And so I arrive at the principle of federalism because it allows us to divide sovereignty and use its powers more constructively. I have argued for the greater use of federal mechanisms since Scotland and Wales voted for devolution in 1997. To my mind this constitutional watershed made the old reasoning of a unitary state founded on Westminster’s parliamentary sovereignty obsolete.’

Glyndwr C Jones affirms: 

‘The accepted distinctiveness and common interests of the constituent nations of the UK demands a new form of governance: firstly to ensure that the link between the people of each territory and their respective democratically elected parliaments is articulated in terms of their sovereignty rights, at a national level, and secondly to remind the overarching, central structure that, when administering the pooled responsibilities, it exists to serve the peoples of all four nations. ‘

‘Intergovernmental relations should therefore be redefined on a stronger formal footing and codified in a new constitutional framework which enhances arrangements for self-government and secures mechanisms for effective isles-wide collaboration.

The booklet is introduced by Guardian columnist Will Hayward, who writes:

‘Whatever your political outlook, inherent biases, or where you live in the UK, it is obvious that the current constitutional framework we have in this country doesn’t work. It clearly doesn’t work for Wales or Scotland, but I think you can make a pretty strong argument that people in parts of England may be the worst served by it. ‘

‘For those who are interested in how one of the oldest democratic systems in the world can run better this is a fascinating exchange. I sincerely hope that many of our elected representatives and decision-makers in London, Cardiff and Edinburgh take the time to read these letters. Not only for the content, but for the manner in which they were conducted.’

TheFederal-Confederal Letters highlight the fact that the establishment of a new written framework for these isles, with the support of the parliaments, would prove invaluable across the political spectrum. Some will find reassurance in attempting to articulate the more distinctive elements of the UK’s practices in a codified federal constitution, whilst others will seek to cement the sovereignty position of the four nations individually in relation to a common confederal British structure. 

What is important is that the debate is had, and had publicly. As both David and Glyndwr reflect at the end of their correspondence:

‘To coin a phrase from Lao Tsu, our thoughts, in the form of these letters, have become words. For our words to become the actions of others will, of course, require a wider forum, and more voices. In the roomy perspective of historical time, we are but thinking aloud, though pleased to have made a contribution to the continuation of this important debate.’

The Federal-Confederal Letters is availablehere as an e-book andhere as an easily printable pdf version.

David Melding CBE was the Welsh Conservative Party’s Director of Policy from 2000 to 2011. David served in the Senedd as one of the list members for South Wales Central from 1999 until retiring in 2021. He was Deputy Presiding Officer between 2011 and 2016, and he chaired several committees during his parliamentary career including the Health and Social Care, and the Legislation and Constitutional Affairs committees. He is the author ofWill Britain Survive Beyond 2020? (2009) and The Reformed Union: The UK as a Federation (2013). He is working on his third book-Wales in an Age of Disunion.

Glyndwr Cennydd Jones is a writer on constitutional matters. He released joint publications with Lord David Owen and Lord Elystan Morgan in 2017 and 2018 respectively. In March 2022, he published a booklet of constitutional reflections titled A League-Union of the Isles, which includes a preface by Lord Carwyn Jones, former First Minister of Wales, and an afterword by Lord David Owen. He is currently writing the bookConfederal-Federalism. Glyndwr works as the Director of a UK-wide industry body in the education and arts sectors, a position he has held since 2012.

Will Hayward is a leading journalist. He is a regular columnist at The Guardian as well as contributing to Times Radio, the BBC, Sky News and LBC. Will was previously Welsh affairs editor at WalesOnline and the Western Mail. 

EBook ofThe Federal-Confederal Letters (2025)

https://simplebooklet.com/thefederalconfederalletters1#page=1

EBook of The Reformed Union: The UK as a Federation (2013)

https://www.iwa.wales/wp-content/media/2013/09/reformedunion-smallpdf-com.pdf

EBook ofA League-Union of the Isles (2022)

https://simplebooklet.com/aleagueunionoftheisles#page=1

By Fraser McMillan and Davide Vampa

In October 1967, a political earthquake struck the Scottish town of Hamilton. The Scottish National Party, until then a marginal force, surged to prominence when Winnie Ewing captured a Westminster seat long held by Labour. That by-election was transformative, marking the start of the SNP’s ascent into mainstream politics – a journey that would ultimately result in devolution, nationalist government, and a close-fought referendum on independence.

Nearly sixty years later, Hamilton has once again become the stage for political disruption. The 2025 Scottish Parliament by-election in Hamilton, Larkhall and Stonehouse – triggered by the death of SNP MSP Christina McKelvie – may prove another symbolic turning point. But this time, it is not the SNP that is making history. Nor is it a straightforward story of Labour revival. The real surprise has been the unprecedented rise of Reform UK, a party that until now had no electoral footprint in Scotland.

A brittle comeback, a significant decline, and a populist surge

The headline result was a Labour victory – the party won with 32% of the vote. This came as a surprise to many given the surrounding media narrative, but it was far from a commanding performance. In fact, the party’s share fell by two points compared to the 2021 Holyrood election, when it was struggling nationally (finishing third across Scotland, behind the Conservatives). However, the one-off nature of the contest and Labour’s large intake of new Scottish MPs following its general election victory last year allowed it to deploy a stronger ground operation, which limited losses and enabled it to finish first. That said, the resilience of the Labour vote even in the shadow of an unpopular UK Labour administration suggests that we will see three-way contests like this springing up all over Scotland next May. The morale boost provided by winning the seat will also allow the party to approach that contest with optimism rather than the doom and gloom that has seemed a fixture since Keir Starmer entered Downing Street last July.

In contrast, the SNP – expected to retain the seat, albeit with a reduced majority – suffered losses largely corresponding to their defeat in that 2024 general election, plunging from 46% to 29%. The party’s polling has stabilised but not risen, and the 29% in this constituency is not far from its national numbers. The even spread of SNP support around the country hurt the party last year, and they will now fear a repeat in 2026, albeit one muted by the proportional electoral system. Labour hope to focus minds on the nationalists’ record in government and make the next Holyrood election about change north of the border, and this result suggests that is their best hope of dislodging John Swinney.

The most notable takeaway from this by-election, however, came from Reform UK, which surged from essentially zero support to 26% – narrowly missing second place but outperforming expectations, including Britain Predicts’ estimate of 23%. Such a result would have been considered a triumph even in an English constituency last year. The fact that it was met with disappointment by some Farage supporters, who had hoped the party would take second or even win, only underscores how dramatic its rise in the Scottish context is. Meanwhile, the Conservatives endured a brutal collapse, falling from 18% to just 6%, and effectively exiting the contest – with Reform not only cannibalising Tory voters but attracting further support.

The scale and asymmetry of these shifts point to a profound political realignment. Labour’s surprise win – driven largely by the SNP’s collapse – was underwhelming in its own right and reveals the absence of a single, dominant beneficiary from the nationalist party’s decline. Instead, Scottish politics appears to be entering a far more fragmented and volatile phase – one in which old certainties are rapidly eroding.

Is this the end of constitutional polarisation?

The defining feature of Scottish politics since the 2014 independence referendum has been structured constitutional polarisation: a mutually reinforcing division between pro- and anti-independence blocs, embodied respectively by the SNP and the Conservatives. This dynamic persisted through the 2021 Scottish election. But the Hamilton by-election reinforces the result of the 2024 general election in demonstrating that this is now a thing of the past.

The SNP’s strategy under John Swinney to elevate Reform UK as its principal opponent – in an effort to create a new form of polarisation – appears to have backfired. Rather than consolidating progressive support, it may have inadvertently legitimised Reform and amplified its appeal among disillusioned voters. Unlike the ‘symbiotic’ SNP-Tory binary of the past, there is currently no clear bulwark against Reform. Labour’s ambiguous positioning, coupled with the Conservatives’ continued decline, leaves the populist right-wing party facing little coordinated resistance.

The result is not the emergence of a new structured polarisation, but its opposite: political flux. If the constitutional question once offered a kind of order to Scottish politics – however contentious – today’s landscape is marked by volatility and fragmentation.

The Reform disruption and its vulnerabilities

Reform UK’s breakthrough, even in defeat, is disruptive. It upended assumptions about the impermeability of Scottish politics to Farage-style populism. The timing was also dramatic: on the day of the by-election, Reform’s chairman Zia Yusuf resigned – a reminder of the party’s internal instability. Leadership crises are not uncommon among populist radical right parties, though they often only temporarily halt their rise. This pattern has been seen elsewhere in Europe. In Germany, for example, AfD’s co-leader Frauke Petry quit shortly after the party’s 2017 breakthrough, when it won nearly 13% of the vote. The departure barely dented AfD’s momentum; by 2025, it had become the country’s second-largest party, with over 20% support.

Whether Reform’s rise in Hamilton is a one-off or the start of a long-term presence at Holyrood remains uncertain. But what is clear is that it taps into deeper discontents – not just with the SNP or Holyrood, but with the entire political establishment. The SNP, after nearly two decades in power, increasingly resembles the status quo it once opposed. Reform’s anti-establishment message, even if simplistic, may resonate in this context. By positioning Reform as its principal opponent, the SNP risks legitimising Farage’s party further – and, in doing so, may inadvertently cast itself as the main target of anti-establishment mobilisation. On the other hand, pro-independence Scots are almost uniformly left of centre and pro-EU and will therefore expect the party to take the fight to the radical right. 

Unlike the SNP’s rise, which was anchored in constitutional identity and aspirations for national self-determination, Reform’s appeal is driven by cultural grievance and rejection of the political class. Its core themes – opposition to immigration, net zero, and socially progressive ‘woke’ politics – reflect a style of politics that, until recently, seemed to resonate primarily with voters in England and Wales. The fact that such a message could gain traction in Scotland – even in a one-off by-election – signals a potential shift in the political terrain.

Still, there are significant obstacles to Reform’s longer-term viability north of the border. Nigel Farage remains deeply unpopular among large segments of the Scottish public, particularly among the pro-independence, pro-EU, and socially progressive voters who make up nearly half of the electorate. This suggests that the party may face a low electoral ceiling, despite its sudden surge. Comparative experiences offer a mixed picture: for example, Italy’s Northern League was able to rebrand and expand significantly into previously hostile territory – even in southern regions where the party had long been despised and virtually absent. Yet this success was short-lived and brought with it internal tensions and the risk of alienating core constituencies.

For Reform UK to move from symbolic success to a sustained presence in Scotland, it will need more than provocative messaging. It will require organisational depth, a credible local infrastructure, and the ability to adapt its rhetoric to a Scottish context. So far, those elements appear lacking. The party’s operations have been erratic, and its campaign – including a controversial advert targeting Anas Sarwar’s Pakistani heritage – drew widespread criticism. The resignation of Yusuf further underscores Reform’s organisational fragility, even at the UK level.

Conclusion: A system without anchors?

While the Hamilton result marks a powerful moment of disruption, it remains unclear whether this will translate into longer-term traction. What it does confirm, however, is that Scottish politics – once seen as unusually structured and stable – is entering an era of growing volatility, where insurgents like Reform can no longer be dismissed out of hand.

The SNP’s attempt to shift from a constitutional to a socio-cultural, progressive-versus-reactionary confrontation has stumbled. Labour’s hoped-for resurgence appears more brittle than assured. Reform UK, while organisationally unstable, has become the wildcard – a disruptive actor in a system that no longer has clear structuring poles.

This fragmentation carries risks. Without structured polarisation, Scottish politics may slide into unstructured volatility. A disruptive polariser like Reform UK could reshape the system without facing a coherent counterforce. In such a scenario, the rules of the political game are not just changing – they may be dissolving altogether.

By Davide Vampa

A New Space for the Populist Radical Right in Scotland

Scotland may be on the brink of a political shift. Polling suggests that Nigel Farage’s Reform UK – a party widely associated with populist radical right politics – could win seats in the Scottish Parliament for the first time. In some surveys, Reform is even outperforming Labour and the Conservatives, positioning itself as the main challenger to the governing Scottish National Party (SNP). While much could change before the next election, the trend is clear: the electoral space for right-wing populism is expanding in Scotland.

Much of the current debate focuses on uniquely Scottish or UK-wide factors behind Reform’s rise. But Scotland’s apparent immunity to right-wing populism in the past – and its possible unravelling now – can be better understood through a broader lens. Looking across Europe reveals patterns, triggers, and consequences that offer crucial lessons for what may lie ahead.

Scotland’s resilience to radical right populism has long rested on the dominance of constitutional debates, particularly during the 2010s. These debates focused on Scotland’s place within the UK and shaped party competition and voter alignments. They also allowed the SNP to absorb or neutralise many of the grievances that populist radical right parties elsewhere in Europe have successfully exploited. But those foundations are shifting. With independence now less dominant in public discourse, space is opening for new political narratives – and Reform UK is seeking to fill that vacuum.

One key reason Scotland has resisted radical right populist movements is the way they have been perceived. In the UK, parties on the radical right have often been associated with English nationalism and hostility to devolution. Even right-leaning Scottish unionist voters were reluctant to support parties like UKIP and the Brexit Party, which appeared to articulate a vision of Britain that excluded or marginalised Scotland. These parties rarely engaged with Scotland on its own terms and were seen as tone-deaf to the complex and plural identities within the Union.

Lessons from Italy: Salvini and the League

However, one lesson from abroad – specifically from Italy – is that perceptions of populist radical right parties can change dramatically. A striking example is the transformation of Italy’s Northern League. Initially a populist, anti-southern party advocating greater autonomy for the wealthy North, the League was widely detested in southern Italy. Its rhetoric portrayed the South as parasitic and backward, calling for a federal or even separatist model that would reduce the South’s political influence and access to resources.

But under Matteo Salvini’s leadership, from 2013 onwards, the League rebranded. It dropped ‘Northern’ from its name, softened its regionalist message, and adopted a national populist agenda. The party redirected its anti-establishment rhetoric from Rome to Brussels, portraying the EU as the new enemy. In doing so, it extended its appeal across Italy, including in the very regions it had previously vilified. In the 2018 general election, the ‘new’ League became a significant political player in all southern Italian regions. It even surpassed 10 per cent of the vote in areas that had been hostile territory – and where it had previously been virtually non-existent – such as Latium (around Rome), Sardinia, and Abruzzo. By 2019, the League had become Italy’s largest party and the second-largest in the South, with over 20 per cent of the vote in that part of the country – a remarkable turnaround that highlights the flexibility, or ‘chameleonic’ nature, of successful right-wing populists.

This transformation was enabled by changing political conditions and the crisis of Italy’s mainstream parties. The collapse of the traditional party system left many voters politically homeless and opened the door for a repackaged League. While Scotland is not experiencing the same degree of systemic collapse, it is entering a period of political flux. The SNP’s long-standing dominance is under pressure, Labour is attempting a comeback, and the Conservatives are struggling to remain relevant. Reform UK is exploiting this volatility by recalibrating its message to resonate more directly with Scottish voters – downplaying its English roots and instead emphasising broader right-wing populist themes, such as anti-elitism, anti-immigration, disillusionment with the political establishment, opposition to net zero policies, and engagement in the so-called culture wars.

In this context, Farage’s trajectory may echo Salvini’s – albeit in a different direction when it comes to Europe. Before Brexit, Brussels was the main target of the anti-establishment rhetoric promoted by Farage’s earlier parties – first UKIP, then the Brexit Party – and their Euroscepticism served as an implicit vehicle for English nationalism. In the post-Brexit landscape, however, Reform UK has reframed this message, shifting its focus away from the EU and concentrating almost exclusively on political elites within Britain, including those in the devolved nations. In this reframing, those in power at all levels – from Westminster to Holyrood and Cardiff Bay – are cast as enemies of the people.

Like Salvini in southern Italy, Farage is capitalising on a more fluid political environment. In Scotland, the independence question no longer appears to structure party competition as decisively as it once did. For nearly a decade, the SNP and the Conservatives – on opposite sides of the constitutional divide – dominated by framing politics around the Union, marginalising more moderate pro-devolution parties such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats. That landscape is now fragmenting. Labour briefly benefited from this shift with a fragile and short-lived resurgence in 2024, but the broader vacuum remains. Into this space, emerging populist themes – ranging from opposition to net zero policies and the so-called ‘war on woke’ to a wider anti-establishment mood – may gain growing traction, offering fertile ground for Reform UK.

The Risks of Territorial Expansion

Still, Salvini’s strategy in Italy was not without risks. While the League initially thrived in a volatile political landscape, its rapid ascent was built on shaky foundations. After a period of remarkable growth, the party’s support declined sharply – falling from Italy’s largest party between 2019 and 2020 to a mid-sized force. Yet it remained transformed: no longer confined to the North, but now a national presence. This expansion, however, brought internal tensions, as the party struggled to balance the demands of its traditional northern base with the expectations of a broader, more diverse electorate. Similar strains could emerge if Reform UK succeeds in expanding into Scotland and Wales. Growth beyond its English heartlands may offer short-term gains and help establish Farage’s party as an authentic UK-wide actor. Yet it would also pose strategic challenges – forcing the party to reconcile competing territorial interests and policy preferences within a single populist platform.

Populist parties, particularly on the right, often thrive by seizing moments of political instability and repackaging familiar grievances. But translating rapid growth into long-term relevance is far more difficult. As the Italian case shows, territorial expansion can be a powerful dynamic – but also a source of strain and eventual decline. For Reform UK, the real challenge may not be whether it can rise across Britain, but whether it can hold together once it does.

Davide Vampa is Senior Lecturer in Territorial Politics and Co-Director of the Centre on Constitutional Change, University of Edinburgh. 

By Arianna Giovannini

The results of the elections held on the 1st of May – which included 14 county councils, 8 unitary authorities, 1 metropolitan district, 2 mayors and 4 ‘metro mayors’ and a parliamentary by-election – leave little room for interpretative doubts. For the first time, a populist radical right force (Reform UK) has swept away all the other political actors in England, shattering the traditional Conservative-Labour duopoly that has long characterised the UK political system. Nigel Farage’s party won most of the votes and seats up for grabs, it gained overall control of 10 out of 23 councils that went to the ballot box, and took both of the newly established combined authority mayoralties that held their inaugural elections – thus redrawing the map of subnational governance in England. It also gained a new parliamentary seat.

The implications of this shift, underpinned by unprecedented levels of voter’s choice fragmentation, cannot be underestimated. While psephologists have promptly crunched the numbers and developed in-depth analyses of the vote, it is interesting to build on their work and reflect on the causes behind the surge in support for Reform, and on what could be done to address them. 

Although we should always be careful in drawing national-level conclusions from subnational elections, this time around the political earthquake that started from the local dimension is undoubtedly sending shockwaves across all levels of government.

The first point to note is that the dramatic success of Farage’s party cannot be explained (or discarded) through the traditional ‘protest vote’ thesis. Support for Reform (or its previous incarnations) should now be understood as a long-term phenomenon that has morphed in shape and magnitude over the past decade, but has never fully waned and is becoming a persisting disruptive feature of the political system. Its first manifestation was through the vote for Brexit in 2016. Since then, electoral volatility has seen Boris Johnson taking down the Red Wall in 2019, and Labour returning to power in 2024, only once it managed to devise an electoral campaign around the slogan of ‘change’. Yet, along the way, both Labour and the Tories have increasingly seen votes fraying in every direction but theirs. In other words, the electorate has been consistently signalling that “things cannot go on as they are”. The two main parties have acknowledged this clarion call, but in practice have done very little in the way of addressing it – generating growing disillusionment and resentment at popular level.

The roots of this widespread sense of discontent are clear. Fourteen years of Conservative rule – marked by unrestrained neo-liberal measures, agglomeration strategies and austerity – have left the UK economy depleted and public services crumbling, carrying harsher effects in lagging areas. Beyond rhetoric, the promise to ‘level up the country’ – the central plank, with ‘getting Brexit done’ of Johnson’s 2019 victory – failed to materialise. Labour pledged to change that, but since it entered public office Starmer’s government has been hesitant in developing a coherent strategy to rebalance the economy, and seems to have reverted to a faster version of the old Conservative playbook. 

What has emerged, against this backdrop, is a territorial backlash rooted in (old and new) territorial fractures grafting onto persisting socio-economic divides as well as over-centralisation of power, that deceive and blur traditional class fault lines. The populist radical right tide registered at this election thrives on the vacuum created by a political system that keeps promising ‘radical change’ but then fails to deliver it, and is thus perceived as distant from and out of touch with the problems that affect local communities. Put differently, it is the latest manifestation of the ‘revenge of the places that don’t matter’ that started to emerge with the vote for Brexit – but has since continued to spread across England.

Linking this back to the election results, for example, it is no coincidence that Reform took hold of the two newly established combined authority mayoralties in Greater Lincolnshire and Hull and East Yorkshire. While these two areas have mixed economic geographies, they include pockets of deep socio-economic deprivation, as a result of deindustrialisation and the negative effects of agglomeration and globalisation. In short, they have become stuck in a ‘developmental trap’, consistently experiencing decline in economic growth, employment, and productivity relative to their neighbours and to their own past trajectories, that none of the main parties have been able to tackle for decades. Unsurprisingly, such discontent translated into support for an anti-system party like Reform at the ballot box – not because it has a credible policy platform, but due to its ability to capture and mobilise local grievance.

The results in County Durham provide another, highly symbolic case in point. Home to the Miners’ Gala and the Pitman’s Parliament, Durham has traditionally been a Labour stronghold. The party held control of the County for around a century, until 2021, when the council fell to no overall control (still with a Labour majority). But, as recent research has shown, the area now includes several ‘left behind neighbourhoods’ with high levels of deprivation. Again, Farage’s party cannily capitalised on this, campaigning on an aggressive platform aimed at attracting support from “neglected voters”. And it did just that: winning an astounding 65 seats out of the 98 available, and pushing the Labour party to fourth place with only 4 seats (-38). Reform held 0 seats in the previous administration, making this result even more remarkable.

Similar dynamics can be observed in other areas that went to the poll on the 1st of May, from Doncaster (where Labour managed to hold on to the mayoralty, but lost control of the council to Reform) to the Runcorn and Helsby by-election (where Reform snitched the seat from Labour by 6 votes). To be sure, after this electoral success, Reform biggest mountain to climb to hold onto power will be to demonstrate its competence (or otherwise) in office – an issue that deserves in-depth analysis in a separate account.

Taken all together, the results of these elections seem to suggest that communities – especially in left behind places – care about their place, and will continue to vote for change until they see it happening. And if none of the main political party can seriously commit to take on this challenge, the electorate will keep turning to the most vociferous alternative to the status quo, i.e. Reform. 

There are risks and opportunities emerging from this scenario. On the negative side, Reform’s seismic performance could push the main political parties in government and opposition to mimic its populist stances (e.g. on immigration). Or it could see the government putting a halt to key policies like devolution aimed at pushing power away from Westminster and foster local autonomy – as this could now be seen as a counterproductive strategy with the potential to give leverage to alternative forces like Farage’s party. Either would be a serious misstep, that could end up adding further fuel to Reform’s fast-spreading populist wildfire.

Instead, Reform’s results should awaken policy-makers, prompting them – and in particular the current Labour government – to deflate populist forces by doing what they will never be able to: rebuild political trust by devising a sustainable, long-term policy agenda that is genuinely place-based, open to devolve real power and resources to local areas, and can truly help address persisting inequalities. After all, to govern is to choose: deliver the radical reforms the country has long been crying out for, or run the risk to succumb to Reform. 

Arianna Giovannini is Professor of Political Sociology in the Department of Economics, Society and Politics at the University of Urbino (Italy), and an Associate Member of the Centre on Constitutional Change.